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Abstract: Over the past two millennia successful pre-modern states in Eurasia adopted and
cultivated Big-God religions that emphasize (i) the rulers legitimacy as divinely ordained and
(ii) a morality adapted for large-scale societies that can have positive economic e¤ects. We make
sense of that development by building on previous research that has conceptualized pre-modern
states as maximizing the rulers prot. We model the interaction of rulers and subjects who
have both material and psychological payo¤s, the latter emanating from religious identity. Overall,
religion reduces the cost of controlling subjects through the threat of violence, increases production,
increases tax revenue, and reduces banditry. A Big-God ruler, who also is a believer, has stronger
incentives to invest in expanding the number of believers and the intensity of belief, as well as
investing in state capacity. Furthermore, such investments often are complementary, mutually
reinforcing one another, thus leading to an evolutionary advantage for rulers that adopted Big-God
religions.
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1 Introduction
After the conversion of Roman Emperor Constantine in the early fourth century CE, Christianity
spread through Europe so that a millennium later no single ruler of note was a heathen. Similarly,
Islam was adopted by all rulers in large parts of Asia and North Africa. Even Judaism, not known
for its missionary zeal, apparently was adopted by Khazarias ruling elite in the eighth century.
Later, of course, those religions spread to most other parts of the world. Even states that did not
adopt monotheistic religions - such as China and states in South and Southeast Asia - encouraged
and emphasized religious practices that have some important e¤ects similar to monotheism - notions
of salvation, morality, and duty adapted for large-scale societies.
A main characteristic of such religions is that they have Big Gods (a term introduced by
Norenzayan 2013) who can be all-knowing and monitor behavior 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
Big Gods dont have to be single gods but they are moralizinggods who engage in continuous
supernatural monitoring in ways that individuals cannot hide from. They can thus inuence a
persons rewards and punishments in life and afterlife alike by having a total view of a persons
behavior. A Big God does not just observe partial snippets of the persons behavior who could
hide some unbecoming facts and acts as they could do with a small god.1
What accounts for the apparent advantage of rulers who adopted and cultivated such religions?
We argue that Big-God religions and ideological frames confer at least two advantages. First, a Big
God confers streamlined and direct legitimacy and status to the ruler as he confers the Mandate
of Heaven or there is a single God and his representative on earth is the King. The rulers
subjects even can identify psychologically with the ruler and render unto Caesar what belongs to
Caesar.2
Second, Big-God religions encourage moral behavior and contribute to large-scale social coop-
1Reincarnation, for example, implies continuous supernatural monitoring, for it would be di¢ cult to avoid and
allow a person to sneak in bad acts so that such bad acts could be hidden during the eventual accounting of a persons
lifetime.
2A long debate emerged about the meaning of the phrase and its surrounding text in the New Testament that
partly revolves around its meaning about the separation of Church and State. That does not concern us here. The
phrase itself implies the legitimacy and the right of the ruler to taxes regardless of the degree of separation between
Church and State. In cases of severe conict, such as the ones that led to the Reformation, Protestant rulers typically
brought the new churches under the rulers close control as happened with the Anglican Church. For an economic
analysis of the Medieval Church as a rm, see Ekelund et al. (1996).
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eration. A Big God is all-knowing and monitors behavior continuously, even though he might not
even need to do so when morality and a sense of guilt are su¢ ciently internalized by individual
believers. Big-God religions encourage moral behavior that contributes to contract enforcement
and large-scale economic exchange - watched people are nice people as stated by Norenzayan
(2013, p.54).
The two functions of Big-God religion - the legitimating and the moralizing ones - have been
identied by several literatures separately, but, to our knowledge, they have not been studied
together as contributing to the evolution of Eurasian states over the past two millennia. On the
one hand, social scientists and historians long have noted the legitimating role of historicreligions
(see, for example, Finer 1997, p. 614). Cosgel and Miceli (2009) and Cosgel et al. (2018) incorporate
the role of religion in legitimating or deligitimating a ruler and easing or impeding tax collection.
On the other hand, evolutionary anthropologists, psychologists, and experimental economists have
identied and attempted to rene how members of large-scale societies tend to have a di¤erent type
of morality than those of small-scale societies, with the former better adapted for more complex
economies (e.g., Henrich et al. 2001; Norenzayan 2013).
Those advantages can translate into larger than otherwise revenue and prots for the ruler. At
high levels of belief, Big Gods monitoring and improved moral behavior of his subjects reduce the
rulers costs of providing internal security against banditry and common crime. Moreover, moral
behavior facilitates economic exchange and increases overall economic activity. The legitimacy and
status of the ruler reduces his subjectsresistance, and his cost of taxation. Investing in Big God
and turning almost all subjects into believers is also a prot-maximizing strategy for the ruler.
That is especially the case, as we show, when the rule is a believer himself or herself.
We examine the e¤ects of Big-God religion within a model in which rulers rst maximize their
prot, the di¤erence between tax revenue and the cost of running the state. That is an approach
adopted by a number of economists and other social scientists in thinking and modeling pre-modern
states.3 In all of the extant models, the payo¤s of rulers and subjects are material. To account for
3 Including Levi (1988), Engineer (1989), Findlay (1990, 1996), Olson (1993), Grossman and Noh (1994), McGuire
and Olson (1996), Robinson (1997), Konrad and Skaperdas (1998, 2007, 2012), Wintrobe (1998), Skaperdas (2001,
2014), Moselle and Polak (2001), Myerson (2008), North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), Leeson (2014), and Vahabi
(2016a, 2016b).
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the e¤ects of religion, we introduce psychological payo¤s for subjects as well as rulers in accordance
with evidence in the psychological literature (Tajfel 1981) and applications in modeling identitys
role in individual behavior and game-theoretic models (see Kalin and Sambanis 2018, for a recent
review).
In the next section we briey discuss the historical context of Big-God religions, their adoption
by states, and the possibility of introducing psychological payo¤s in rational-choice models.
We then examine a setting without a state  anarchy  in which the population sorts itself
between producers and bandits in the presence of both believers and heathens, the former paying a
psychological penalty for being bandits. Producers engage in both self-protection and production.
From an economic viewpoint in this setting, it is better to have a larger fraction of the population
become producers and have the producers allocate fewer resources to self-protection. As the fraction
of believers increases, we nd a step-wise increase in the number of producers. Thus, the morality
of believers by itself can increase total production even though individualized self-protection is not
as e¢ cient as more collective types of security.
In the subsequent three sections we introduce and examine a ruler who provides security as a
public good, but also uses the input for that public good - guards who are specialists in violence -
to extract revenue from producers. Thus, producers allocate resources to self-protection to reduce
the rulers tax levies as well as against bandits. Believer producers value the status and prestige of
the ruler and invest, relative to heathen producers, fewer resources into self-protection and more in
production. A Big-God rulers prots are higher than those of a heathen ruler at low enough and
high enough fractions of believers. At low fractions of believers, the ruler does not benet from
having more producers than otherwise and the rulers prot comes solely from the lower compen-
sation of guards, who are believers rather than heathens. That possibly represents the early phase
of the expansion of Big-God religions that are conned to the elites and their immediate subor-
dinates. At intermediate fractions of believers, the rulers material prots actually are declining
gradually in the population share of believers because all new believers become producers who are
more vulnerable to heathen bandits than heathen producers are. At higher fractions of believers,
the rulers material prots are strongly increasing and then remain at a high level. The additional
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prots at high enough levels of religiosity come from the extra tax revenue received from believer
producers, the larger fraction of believers who become producers, as well as the lower wages paid
to believer guards.
The question that emerges, then, is that if we were to consider solely the material prots of the
ruler, the ruler would have no incentive to encourage religiosity at intermediate levels of believers.
That can change, however, if the ruler himself were to be a believer who values religiosity, both the
extent of belief and its intensity. Then, the rulers total payo¤, which includes both material and
psychological components, is everywhere increasing in the number of believers in the population as
well as the intensity of belief.
We then analyze the incentives for a ruler to invest in converting the population to believers as
well as in intensifying moral beliefs and enhancing his own status and legitimacy; that is, we examine
the incentives for a ruler to invest in temples, churches, or mosques, in priests, or in regularized
rituals. At lower and intermediate levels of the number of believers, we nd complementarity
between the incentives to invest in conversion and in enhancing the rulers legitimacy. Moreover,
we nd these investments to also be complementary to investing in state capacity, the ability of the
state to provide collective security more e¤ectively as well as its capacity to extract revenues (for
research on the topic, see Besley and Persson 2011, McBride et al. 2011, or Johnson and Koyama
2017). When the fraction of believers is large enough, the marginal benet of investing in morality
can be at a maximum under certain conditions.
Thus, the various components of religious investments - in conversion, in morality, in legitimacy -
appear to co-evolve with one another as well as with state capacity, albeit di¤erently across di¤erent
levels of religiosity. The stronger incentives to invest in morality when the number of believers is
large are consistent with the recent empirical ndings of Whitehouse et al. (2019) who argue that
moralizing gods typically follow by centuries a societys measured level of complexity, but one
would need to look closer to the underlying data to make a better informed determination about
that conclusion.4 More generally, the fact that the Big-God religions adopted by Eurasian rulers
4Whitehouse et al. (2019) show how their measure of societys complexity typically precedes their measures of
moralizing high godsor of broad supernatural punishment. While their measure of societys complexity appears
to be polity populationand is shown to be highly correlated with other measures, they dont seem to focus on the
role of rulers and the state as much as we do in this paper. Nevertheless, their data possibly could be adapted and
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have multiple tendencies - the tendency to seek converts, to emphasize ruler legitimacy and large-
society morality as well as their complementarity with building greater state capacity - indicate
that Big-God religions comprise a packageof attributes. While a single component of the package
might not confer a clear advantage onto rulers, the whole of it is more likely to be successful in
the long-run and the reason that rulers who adopted such packages tended to survive longer than
those who did not.
2 Empires, religion and individual psychology
Two main instruments have been identied for rulers to gain, maintain, and enhance their power:
The Sword and the Word; violence (and the threat of violence) and persuasion. The latter includes
ideologies and religion that could be considered forms of congealed persuasion, the accumulated
arguments and understandings from the past that help people make sense of their world.
The rulers of the earliest empires that appeared in Eurasia and Egypt likely used persuasion
mechanisms to enhance their legitimacy and for their populations to identify with their regime.
Although the evidence is thin on that dimension it does point to a gradual movement from heavy
reliance on brute force (the Hittite Empire) to more dependence on the status or prestige of the
ruler.5 The Assyrian Empire and then even more so the Achaemenid Persian Empire, for example,
appeared to adopt a softer touch. Yet, early forms of Big moralizing Gods do not appear to have
penetrated the beliefs of the masses. Zoroastrianism, for instance, was an early form of monotheism
that was adopted by the Persian Empire, but essentially was a religion of the elites, although it was
e¤ective in facilitating tribute collection on the basis of the legitimacy and prestige of its rulers.6
The available evidence points as well to a gradual emergence and spread of morality and pro-
sociality t for larger societies. Norenzayan (2013, Ch. 7) surveys the historical and other evidence.7
used to examine empirical hypotheses that emerge herein.
5Finer (1997), Mann (1986), Dudley (1991), and Cunli¤e (2017) provide overviews and evidence on early empires.
6See Holland (2005, Ch.2). The Zoroastrian Big God - Ahura Mazda - also was adopted by Darius to legitimate
his usurpation of power and his acceptance by Persian elites. However, Darius and other Persian kings were very
tolerant of other gods in their vast empire. One di¤erence with many of the states that adopted Big Gods later was
intolerance of lesser gods or, in some cases, of other Big-God religions.
7The evidence includes game-theoretic experiments in di¤erent types of societies, including hunter-gatherers. For
example, Henrich et al. (2001) have found that individuals from less complex societies behave in a less pro-social
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Ritual and constant visual reminders (for example, houses of worship) that enhance the rulers
prestige and legitimacy and increase moral conformity spread over the past two millennia with
the active help of rulers. Big Gods intensied the monitoring and the discipline with which large
populations shared common norms and abided by them.
Associated with the spread of a new individual morality is the spiritual and intellectual awak-
eningthat occurred almost simultaneously across Eurasia during the Axial Age, around the fth
and fourth centuries BCE (Jaspers [1949] 2011). From Plato and Socrates in Greece, to the Bud-
dha in India, to Confucius in China, philosophies, ideologies, and religions were articulated that
emphasized what we now consider as self-evident individual morality in large-scale societies. The
ideas and thoughts took centuries and millennia to spread to the nooks and crannies of societies
around the world. Rulers picked up on the great thinkers and started propagating their thoughts,
but, of course, with twists and turns that could be considered self-interested on their part. Con-
fuciusthought, for instance, was adopted by many Chinese warring states rulers and by the Han
emperors afterwards, but with an emphasis on social hierarchy that has been argued did not exist
in Confuciusthought itself (Creel 1949).
From an economic, rational-choice perspective, the two e¤ects of Big-God religion that we
examine - the enhancement of rulers legitimacy and the spread of morality - work themselves
through individual psychological payo¤s. Those payo¤s are part of the identities of individuals, as
rst argued within economics by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). We employ the particular modeling
approach, based on the psychological literature (such as Tajfel 1981), that has been used to model
social identities in modern times (e.g., Shayo 2009; Sambanis and Shayo 2013; Sambanis et al.
2015).
The model and approach likewise are also consistent with those of the economics of religion
literature (see Iannaccone 1998; Iyer 2016, for overviews). If anything, especially compared to
models that are intended to explain specic aspects of modern religious behavior, ours is too
simple (or even too simplistic), but that necessarily is so for tractability as we intend to understand
a long-run macro-historical phenomenon that involves multiple actors. One particular study that
fashion in ultimatum, public-good, and dictator games.
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complements our approach is that of Raskovich (1996), who provides an intriguing industrial-
organization perspective on the emergence of Yahweh as a single God out of multiple pagan cults
and gods, partly encouraged by Israelite kings such as David for political reasons.
What we do not consider in this paper explicitly is the military competition between rulers that
has been important historically. Nevertheless, our ndings inform long-run patterns of Eurasias
history. For a religious state to survive it had to be able to defend itself against other states, espe-
cially heathen ones. The gradual conversion or conquest of heathen rulers by Big-God ones appears
to have been the long-run outcome over the past two millennia (and before modern times). In the
meantime, plenty of heathen rulers and states invaded and subjugated Big-God rulers and states.
Goth, Frank, and other Germanic rulers invaded a weak Roman Empire that was in the process of
Christianization before the rulers themselves converted to Christianity. Similar trajectories were
followed by Viking and Slavic rulers raiding and even conquering Christian states before themselves
becoming converts. Huns, Mongols, and Turks raided almost all of Eurasia and conquered a large
chunk of it, but they did not establish lasting states until they converted to Islam themselves. Like-
wise, the last imperial dynasty of China, which lasted for almost three centuries, was created by
steppe conquerors, the Qing/Manchus, who kept and adopted traditional Chinese culture, religious
practices, and statecraft.
Many cases can be found in which the heathens were repelled and were conquered themselves,
but our ndings are consistent with the pattern we have just described in the following sense: Big-
God religions facilitate greater wealth accumulation and induce better state capacity for the rulers
who adopt them; this wealth attracts continual probing and occasional conquest by less wealthy, less
politically organized fringe rulers without Big Gods; the new rulers themselves nd Big Gods more
protable to adopt and the cycle starts again with new probings from the fringes of civilization.
That cyclical historical pattern was identied long ago by the 14th century Arab historian and
social scientist Ibn Khaldûn (see Khaldûn 1994) who had emphasized the gradual softeningthat
occurs in sedentary civilizations, making them ripe for conquest by hardened mountaineers and
nomads. Our approach, does not preclude that scenario, but focuses on the advantages conferred
by greater ruler legitimacy and large-society morality brought about by Big-God religions. Given
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the historical record, it is not individual state survival that a Big God facilitates but, through
its advantages, a Big God strengthens its own chances of survival by inducing successive heathen
conquerors to convert as well as keeping the unconquered in its camp.
3 Anarchy with morality
The dening characteristic of any state is the provision of security: personal, physical, or property
security. Economic activity presupposes basic security and other public goods cannot be provided
safely without security. To clarify ideas and serve as a basis of comparison with the subsequent
modeling of states under for-prot rulers, we begin with anarchy, a setting in which security is
the main concern and the population sorts itself between producers and bandits. To the analogous
framework of Konrad and Skaperdas (2012), in which individuals care solely about material payo¤s,
we add psychological payo¤s that believers enjoy depending on whether they become producers or
bandits. For simplicity, non-believers (or heathens) care only about material payo¤s. Morality is
the sole determinant of psychological payo¤s here. The psychological payo¤s due to legitimacy by
necessity require the presence of a state and will thus be introduced in the next section.
Each producer has one unit of a resource that he can distribute between work and self-protection
the higher is the level of self-protection, the lower is the amount of productive work and the lower
is the output that can be produced. Denoting self-protection activity by x, a producer can keep a
share s(x) of output away from bandits, where s(x) is increasing, di¤erentiable, and strictly concave
in x , with s(x) 2 [0; 1]; s(0) = 0 and s(1) = 1.
Believers who become producers enjoy the additional psychological payo¤ p > 0 , so that their
total payo¤ becomes:
Up(x) = s(x)(1  x) + p (1)
Heathens who become producers correspondingly capture only the material payo¤:
Uhp(x) = s(x)(1  x) (2)
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We do not assume that heathens cannot capture moral psychological payo¤s, but that those payo¤s
are di¤erent from Big-God beliefs in the sense that they are better suited for small-scale rather
than large-scale societies (as argued in Henrich et al. 2001, or Norenzayan 2013). The notions of
stealing and banditry, for example, tend to be looked down upon more in Big-God religions than
in pagan and tribal religions. We thus e¤ectively normalize the moral payo¤ of heathens to zero.
Each producer chooses a level of self-protection x so as to maximize his payo¤. Let x denote
the unique level of optimal self-protection, which is independent of the psychological payo¤ p (and
thus both believer and heathen producers choose the same level of self-protection).
Bandits are looking for producers upon whom to prey. Let p denote the population share of
producers and let b represent the share of bandits so that p + b = 1. All bandits earn the same
material payo¤: [1   s(x)](1   x)pb = [1   s(x)](1   x) p1 p . That is, bandits extract 1   s(x)
of output from each producer who has not previously been robbed and the larger is the ratio of
producers to bandits, the better it is for a bandit. Then, letting s  s(x), the payo¤s of believer
and heathen bandits are:
Ub(p) = (1  s)(1  x) p
1  p   bwhereb > 0 (3)
Uhb(p) = (1  s)(1  x) p
1  p (4)
That is, a believer who becomes a bandit incurs a positive psychological cost b. Let Up 
s(1  x) + p and Uhp  s(1  x)._
We are interested in determining the shares of the population who become producers and
bandits as a function of their identities and other parameters. In particular, we dene an anarchic
equilibrium as a number of peasants p (and a number of bandits b where b = 1   p) such
that no producer wants to become a bandit (Uip  Uib(p) for i = ; h) and no bandit wants to
become a producer (Uib(p)  Uip for i = ; h). The equalities in payo¤s hold when there are both
producers and bandits of an identity type; strict inequalities can hold only when those with an
identity become solely either producers or bandits.
The numbers of producers and bandits depend on the relative number of believers and heathens
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in the population. Let  2 [0; 1] denote the population proportion of believers. Proposition 1
summarizes the anarchic equilibrium for the various fractions of believers.
Proposition 1: A unique anarchic equilibrium exists for every fraction of believers  2
[0; 1]. In particular,
(i) When  2 [0; s), the equilibrium number of producers equals the output share kept by each
producer ( p = s). All believers become producers, s    of heathens become producers and the
remainder (1  s) become bandits.
(ii) When  2 [s; s(1 x)+(1 x)+ ] (where   p + b), producers comprise all believers ( p = )
and all heathens become bandits.
(iii) When  2 ( s(1 x)+(1 x)+ ; 1], p = s
(1 x)+
(1 x)+ , all heathens become bandits. All producers are
believers but   s(1 x)+(1 x)+ believers become bandits.
(For all proofs not included in the main text, please see the Appendix.)
         
Figure 1 about here
         
Figure 1 shows how the number of producers varies with the number of believers in a step-wise
fashion. It is drawn assuming that s(x) = x and  = 0:25. Total output, being proportional to
the number of producers ( p(1   x)), follows exactly the same trajectory. At a proportion of
believers below the share of output that producers keep away from bandits (i.e., s), producers do
not increase in number as the number of believers increase - over that range, any extra believers
become producers and the displaced heathen producers become heathen bandits, not changing the
essential nature of the anarchic equilibrium in the complete absence of believers.
The e¤ect of believers on the economy becomes substantial after they reach the critical mass of
s. As the proportion of believers increases beyond that point all extra believers become producers
and displace heathens who are bandits. The remaining heathens all are bandits, whose payo¤
nevertheless increases as the number of believer producers increases.
The process of strictly increasing producers in the number of believers stops when believers
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reach such a level - and heathens are reduced su¢ ciently - so as to tempt some believers into
becoming bandits. That threshold level ( s
(1 x)+
(1 x)+ ) depends positively on the sum () of the
psychological benet of a believer-producer and the psychological cost of a believer-bandit as well
as on the self-protected share of production s. Even when everybody is a believer, the number of
producers remains at that level - despite the psychological cost. The material benets of banditry
are compelling given that too many producers can be preyed upon.
Thus far, all security is provided individually. Morality can help increase production and reduce
banditry, but even when everybody is a believer, banditry cannot be eliminated completely. A
possibly complementary alternative to morality is allocating more resources to security, which
could be provided by the community more e¢ ciently than could be provided individually; building
houses close to one another to e¤ectively create a fort, having a militia, developing a legal and
justice system. Ideally, such collective security could be provided by a self-governing community.
However, a Leviathan, a for-prot ruler, likewise, could provide such security. The problem is
that for-prot rulers could deploy the means of violence at their disposal not just against bandits,
but also against the producers themselves and extract from them even more wealth than bandits
ever could. Konrad and Skaperdas (2012), in models with material payo¤s only, show that self-
governing communities are best in terms of creating material welfare. However, such communities
are at a severe disadvantage in the presence of for-prot rulers when they have to ght against them
to maintain their independence. Self-governing communities have to be small to control free-rider
problems but they face formidable problems in controlling both internal and external security, the
latter relative to for-prot rulers. That observation is consistent with the dearth of self-governing
communities in history.8 Moreover, Big-God religions typically were rst adopted by rulers and
their narrow elites surrounding them. Therefore, in the remainder we will examine models with
for-prot rulers (who also can be believers) providing collective security.
8Konrad and Skaperdas (2012) examine two polar extremes: The case of a ruler who captures all prots and the
case of an egalitarian community that provides collective goods voluntarily. Of course, in practice many intermediate
governance structures are observed, from fairly egalitarian democracies in some early Mesopotamian and classical
Greek city-states to ruling elite self-governance in Medieval Europe (on the latter see, e.g., Salter and Young 2018).
Myerson (2008) shows how powerful rulers might want restraints on their powers so as to maximize their prots.
Skaperdas (2014) discusses conditions under which self-governance might emerge. In what comes next, we do not
conceive of the states prots literally going to a single person, but a ruling elite, which is perhaps narrow, that shares
those prots.
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4 Big-God ruler: preliminaries
In addition to producers taking self-protection measures, we now introduce a single ruler who can
provide security as a public good by hiring guards and having other means at his disposal to protect
producers against bandits. Let g denote the number of guards, the input to the public good of
security. The output of that good is g 2 [0; 1] (where  > 1). While g is treated as exogenous, ,
which inuences the e¤ectiveness of protection o¤ered by guards, is interpreted as a measure of state
capacity and considered endogenous in the long-run in Section 6. For every level of self-protection
undertaken by an individual producer and level of g provided by the ruler, each producer keeps the
following share of his production away from bandits: s(x+ g) if x+ g  1;1 if x+ g  1: (Note
from the previous section that s(1) = 1.)
The question then becomes, why would a producer ever engage in self-protection, given that
self-protection redirects resources from production (as production equals 1 x). The reason is that
the ruler does not just provide collective security by the hiring of guards out of the goodness of his
heart, as the Seven Samurai or the Magnicent Seven might do. In addition to providing security
against bandits, guards double as enforcers in extracting tribute from producers. In particular,
we assume that producers can retain the same share of their production from the rulers hands
and his guards as they can keep away from bandits. We could expect at least some rulers to be
able to extract more from producers than bandits can, but our qualitative results do not change
without complicating the analysis unnecessarily.9 Then, the tax rate,  , received by the ruler is
the di¤erence between what is kept away from bandits and what producers can keep away from the
rulers guards:
 = s(x+ g)  s(x) (5)
By increasing the number of guards the ruler automatically increases the tax rate, provided of
course that x+ g  1:
Given than a ruler can extract the same amount of wealth as a bandit, a heathen producers
9Konrad and Skaperdas (2012) examine that case in the absence of believers in Big-God religions. Since rulers
can extract more from producers than bandits can, more resources are allocated to self-protection and production
lower than in anarchy. Because rulers extract a larger share of production than bandits do, overall welfare also is
lower than under anarchy.
13
optimization problem is exactly the same as before and the choice of self-protection is the same as
under anarchy, x, so that production also is the same as under anarchy, 1  x.
Things are di¤erent, however, for a producer who is a believer. In particular, the rulers status
or prestige - and the rulers personal contribution to that of the producer - provides the producer
with a psychological payo¤.10 That assumption also accords with rendering unto Caesar what is
Caesars. We therefore modify a believers payo¤ so that he or she benets partly from the tax
paid to the ruler:
Up = s(x)(1  x) + p + (1  x)where  2 (0; 1)
Given that the tax rate depends partly on self-protection through (5), the payo¤ function of a
believer producer becomes
Up(x) = [(1  )s(x) + s(x+ g)](1  x) + p (6)
The optimal level of self-protection for a producer who is a believer and ascribes status to the ruler
turns out to be less than that under anarchy or that of a heathen producer.
Proposition 2: Let  2 (0; 1) and let x denote the optimal level of self protection of a
producer who is a believer with the payo¤ function in (6). Then,
(i) x < x and x is decreasing in ;
(ii) the production of a believer producer (1   x) that of a heathen producer (1   x) and is
increasing in ;
(iii) the material payo¤ of a producer who is a believer is decreasing in  and is less than that
of a heathen producer .
By allocating fewer resources to self-protection, believer producers invest more resources in
production, allowing larger shares to the ruler and bandits. That can be of advantage to the ruler.
However, another advantage to the ruler is that he potentially could hire believers as guards at a
lower cost than heathens because of part (iii) of the Proposition: believer producers earn materially
10For introducing such status payo¤s in theoretical models, see Shayo (2009), Sambanis and Shayo (2013), and
Sambanis et al. (2015). For a rational-choice approach to religious authority, see McBride (2016). Konrad and Qari
(2012) provide evidence of greater tax compliance for those who feel more patriotic.
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less than heathen producers because they value what they give to the ruler. An example of the
self-protection technology is a class of functions s(x) = x for  2 (0; 1]. In fact, to facilitate
analytical results and for simplicity we will assume for the remainder of the paper that particular
functional form with  = 1:
Assumption A: s(x) = x
Under Assumption A, we have the following values for the di¤erent variables of interest:
x = 1=2; 1  x = 1=2; Uhp = s(1  x) = 1=4
x =
1  g
2
; (1  x) = 1 + g
2
; x(1  x) = 1  (g)
2
4
(7)
The tax burden on both heathen and believer producers under Assumption A turns out to be
the same and equals g. We consider g to be given parametrically, perhaps keeping in mind the
short- and medium run, but our results in the remainder hold for any values of g that satisfy the
other assumptions of the model. We think of  as the level state capacity, the ability of the ruler
and the elites that surround him to mobilize guards for protection against bandits, but also for
extracting taxes from producers. Since the maximum of security provided by the combined inputs
of the individual producer and the ruler cannot exceed 1, i.e., x + g  1 and, by Assumption A,
x = 12 , we must have g  12 . In fact, for the remainder of this paper, we examine the cases in
which g < 12 , or that security is imperfect and some bandits (heathens or believers) are active, for
otherwise no reason could be found for having the morality among believers that makes it costly
for them to become bandits.
5 A ruler with believer subjects
We now turn to examining the rulers prot as a function of the fraction of believers  2 [0; 1]
under his rule, with the remainder of the subjects (1 ) being heathens. The timing is as follows:
1. The ruler decides how many of the g guards will be believers and how many heathens.
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2. The remaining population (1   g) makes choices between becoming producers and bandits
such that no producer has an incentive to become a bandit and no bandit has an incentive to
become a producer.
Recall that the number of guards determines under Assumption A both the level of the pub-
lic good g supplied that is partly protecting producers from bandits as well as rulers tax rate
extracted by guards, g. The payo¤ of a heathen producer will be the same as under anarchy,
which under Assumption A is x(1   x) = (12)(12) = 14 , whereas the payo¤ of a heathen bandit
should be at least equal to that of a heathen producer; it would be strictly larger if no producers
are heathens.11 Heathens hired as guards by the ruler will have to receive the going payo¤ for
heathens which will be that of the producer (i.e., 14). Also under Assumption A, the payo¤ of a
believer producer is
Up =
1  (g)2
4
+ p + g
1 + g
2
=
(1 + g)2
4
+ p (8)
where the material part of the payo¤ is from (7). The payo¤ of a believer bandit will be at least
as great as that of believer producer and no believer bandits will be active unless some producers
are believers. Moreover, because believer bandits incur a moral cost (b) and the alternative payo¤
of being a producer in (8) includes both a moral payo¤ and the status payo¤, no believers will be
bandits unless some bandits are heathens (except for the limiting case when no one is a heathen and
 = 1). Believers hired as guards by the ruler enjoy the same psychological payo¤s of p+g
1+g
2
that believer producers enjoy (in (8)) and they therefore need to receive only 1 (g)
2
4 in material
payo¤s from the ruler (which is less than 14 , the payo¤ of heathen guards).
12 Thus, from the point
of view of the ruler, believer guards are cheaper than heathen guards.
11 It is not possible to have the payo¤ of a heathen producer strictly greater than that of a heather bandit as it is
xed by their productive and self-protection e¤orts.
12 It also is possible for guards to have higher psychological payo¤s than producers because the ruler can motivate
them with team and religious instruction that exceed the returns to being peasant producers. The ruler thus could
o¤er even lower material wages than those expected by believer producers. Of course, such a specication would
make our results stronger than they are.
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For given , the number of guards and the types of guards chosen by the ruler determine how
believers and heathens sort themselves between producers and bandits. The rulers prots are as
follows:
r = (g)g
1 + g
2
+ h(g)g
1
2
  g 1  (g)
2
4
  gh 1
4
(9)
where g = g+ gh; (g) is the induced number of believer producers, h(g) is the induced number
of heathen producers, g are the believer guards hired and gh are the heathen guards hired. The
rst term includes the tax on each believer producer (g) and the output of a believer producer
(1+g2 ); similarly, for the second term for heathen producers.
The types of outcomes in terms of who is hired as guard and who becomes producer or bandit
depends on the number of believers relative to the number of heathens. Table 1 summarizes the
four intervals of [0; 1] as the number of believers successively rises. (The values of 0 and 1 depend
on the other parameters of the model and will be derived in due course.)
         
Table 1 about here
         
To illustrate how we proceed in showing those outcomes, we begin with the rst case wherein
 2 [0; g]. Typically, in that case, fewer believers are available than guards to be hired (except when
 = g) and the ruler therefore has the option of hiring all believers as guards, with the remainder
of the guards necessarily will have to be heathens. Believers are cheaper to hire than heathens but
they also generate more tax revenue as producers than do heathens (g 1+g2 vs. g
1
2). However,
the rulers decision about whether to hire believers as guards or to let them choose to become
producers is not a straight tradeo¤ between the extra tax revenue from a believer producer versus
the cost savings from hiring the same believer as guard. The reason is that a believer producer
also is more lucrative to bandits as bandits get both a larger share (1+g2   g versus 12   g) and
a larger target output (1+g2 versus
1
2) from a believer producer than from a heathen producer.
That is, signicant wealth would leak to bandits if the ruler were to have a believer become a
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producer, especially in the presence of heathen bandits, instead of hiring him as a guard.
It turns out that it is optimal for the ruler to hire all believers as guards when  2 [0; g]. (We
show in the Appendix why having them turn into producers is not optimal for the ruler.) Given
that all  of the believers become guards and the rest of the guards are heathens, how do the
remaining heathens distribute themselves between producers and guards? With the number of
producers denoted by p(= h(g)) and that of bandits by 1  p  g, the payo¤ of heathen producer
(14) must be equal to that of bandits:
1
4
= (
1
2
  g)1
2
p
1  p  g
which yields
p =
1  g
2(1  g)
_
The rulers payo¤ (see (9)) then becomes:
r( 2 [0; g]) = 1  g
2(1  g)g
1
2
   1  (g)
2
4
  (g   )1
4
(10)
=
g
4
(   1)
(1  g) +

4
(g)2
We summarize the main ndings about the rulers payo¤as a function of the number of believers
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Let Assumption A be satised. Then, the distribution of subjects among the
di¤erent occupations is shown as in Table 1 and the following results hold:
(i) For  2 [0; g], the rulers payo¤ is strictly increasing in ;
(ii) For  2 (g; 0), where 0 = 1+g(1+g 2g)(1+g)1+(1+g 2g)(1+g) , the rulers payo¤ is strictly decreasing
in ;
(iii) For  2 [0; 1], where 1 = (1+g)(1+g)
2+4 2g2(1+g)
2(1+g)2+4 2g(1+g) , the rulers payo¤ is strictly
increasing in ;
(iv) For  2 (1; 1], the rulers payo¤ is constant at the level 1.
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        -
Figure 2 about here
        -
Figure 2 shows how a Big-God rulers prot varies with the share of believers under his rule. It
satises Assumption A and is drawn for parameter values g = 0:16;  = 3;  = 0:8, and  = 0:25.
The rulers prot is higher than a heathens one (assumed to be where  = 0) at su¢ ciently low and
high levels of . For intermediate levels of , a Big-God ruler can capture a slightly lower prot than
a heathen one; those are the levels at which too much leakageto bandits from believer producers
materializes.13 At low population proportions of believers (below g), the ruler solely benets by
having to spend less on guards because believer guards require less material compensation since
they also derive moral and status payo¤s from their positions. It would not benet the ruler to
have believers become producers because they would present more tempting targets to bandits than
heathen producers do. In intermediate ranges of  (2 (g; 0)), the addition of believer producers
induces more heathens to become bandits, thereby reducing both the total number of producers
and the rulers payo¤. Only when enough believers are present in the population do heathens
become bandits exclusively (  0); new believers increase the rulers payo¤ one-for-one by the
amount of tax collected. When believers are plentiful enough (beyond  = 1) so as to present
lucrative enough targets even for believer-bandits, do the extra believers become bandits. Then,
over that range, any heathen bandit is replaced by a believer who also becomes a bandit. That
critical level of 1 can rise, so that more believers become producers, when the moral payo¤s of
believers ( = p + b) increase.
Mature Big-God rulers face a high population proportion of believers, and actively campaign
for their expansion. Examples of dynamic Big-God rulers can be found who initially had a limited
number of believers, such as in early Islam, in which the believers were limited to specialists in
violence, as it is in the model.
13That could, of course, potentially be reduced or eliminated if the Big-God ruler were to provide more protection to
believer producers than to heathen producers, but that policy might seem arbitrary from a modeling and substantive
viewpoint.
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It should be emphasized that essentially all of the material benets from the publicly provided
security (through g) are captured by the ruler as prots. Heathens enjoy the same payo¤s as
under anarchy, except when heathens are few enough to co-exist with believer producers (that is,
for  > 0).
14 In fact, believers receive a lower material payo¤ than under anarchy as they are
compensated by the psychological status payo¤ from the rulers revenue.
Note that morality does not play a role in increasing the rulers prots, except by increasing
the level of 1 and, therefore, yielding more prots as  increases when   1. Furthermore, all
extra economic benets in the model come from the greater publicly nanced security and the fewer
resources allocated to self-protection by believer producers. There is no trade of other sources of
e¢ ciency in the model that could improve economic activity because of better contral enforcement.
To accommodate such considerations, we could modify the model in the following manner: Let
A(y; ) be an increasing function of the total output in the economy (y) and () the average
morality in the economy. The expression A(y; ) > 1 with y > y for some y and  > 0 can be a
coe¢ cient that multiplies all material payo¤s (in a manner analogous to the A in the Ak model of
endogenous growth theory; see Aghion and Howitt 1997). Then, as output increases as a result of
having more security and more believer producers (who produce more than heathen producers) as
well as having higher average morality that enhances contract enforcement, the e¤ects of increasing
 would be larger for the rulers prots and for overall output as well.
6 A believer ruler investing in Big God
In the 25 years between his victory [over Maxentius] and his death, Constantine
ordered a sequence of huge church buildings, from Rome to the Holy Land. All were
built largely at the Emperors expense. This deluge of Christian publicity exceeded any
other programme in precious stone which was realized by a ruler in antiquity....
. In Spring 313, Constantine wrote again to the pagan governor of North Africa, ex-
14The conclusion is explained partly by the simplifying assumption that producers - either heathens or believers -
can resist the ruler and his guards as easily as they can bandits. Making it harder for producers to resist the ruler
can be expected to increase the resources expended by producers expended on self-protection and reduce production.
That outcome is not necessarily better for the ruler because it could reduce total tax revenue. See Konrad and
Skaperdas (2012) for such modeling without the psychological payo¤s we have included in this paper.
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empting the clergy of the recognized Catholic Church from the burdens of civic o¢ ce....
The Christian prayers, said Constantine, were intimately connected with the safety of
the state. (Lane Fox 1986, p. 623)
Religious beliefs start organically and usually fulll local and specialized needs that can grow
or zzle out in competition with other beliefs. In the Roman Empire, Christianity was one of
many competing beliefs of other Big-God religions and traditional pagan ones. When Emperor
Constantine converted to Christianity, no more than 5% of Romes population has been estimated
to have been Christian and the countryside had almost none of them (Lane Fox 1986, Ch.6).
Moreover, Christianity did not have one version even then, as Arianism was a major competitor
to what turned out to be Orthodox Catholicism after the Council of Nicaea in 325, which took
place under the watchful eye of the emperor. Christianity became the state religion of the Roman
Empire and all European states that came to existence afterwards. Emperors, kings, and the
aristocracy built churches, endowed monasteries, sponsored the clergy and gave them privileges,
punished pagans and heretics, and tried to evangelize the heathen countryside.
All of that required signicant economic resources, but both spreading and maintaining the
salience of Big God in peoples everyday lives requires continual reminders (Norenzayan 2013). We
can think of such expenditures as investments on the part of rulers. In terms of our model, the
investments can be on both the extensive margin (by increasing the share of believers ) and on two
intensive margins, by increasing the status parameter  or the morality parameter . Evangelizing
missionaries are operating mostly on the extensive margin; having a village church and priest,
regular mass and Sunday school operate on the intensive margins.
There is one problem, however, with the model of a ruler who cares solely about material prots
for, as we have seen, over the range of the population fraction of believers  in (g; 0) increasing
that fraction reduces prots. Such a ruler would not have an incentive to invest in religion, unless
his investment could leapfrog the share of believers considerably beyond 0, and that would be
di¢ cult to achieve within one rulers reign. On the contrary, an incentive would exist to disinvest
in Big-God religion.
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Qualitative historical evidence indicates that many rulers who do invest in religion are believers
themselves (or, if they are not believers, they are able to hide their non-beliefs very well). It would
be di¢ cult to rationalize Constantines choice to publicly embrace and support Christianity without
any resort to genuine belief. For, at the time, the Roman elites and the army overwhelmingly were
pagan and coming out in support of Christianity was controversial to say the least (see the accounts
of Lane Fox 1986, or Fletcher 1997).15 Many examples can be found of later European kings who
converted to Christianity for opportunistic reasons and did not do anything to advance the religion
(examplars include Anglo-Saxon kings in England in the sixth century, Saxon kings in Germany
in the seventh century, of Wend (Slavic) rulers in what was once East Germany in the ninth and
tenth centuries - see Fletcher 1997). Only after European rulers plausibly did become believers
did they invest in spreading Christianity. As an instance away from Europe, we can consider King
Ashoka of the Mauryan Empire in Northern India (fourth century BCE) who in mid-reign changed
his former ruthless ways and became a believer in, and apostle of, Buddhism (Keay 2000).
To the material prot of the previous section we thus add the following psychological payo¤ for
a ruler who is a believer: h(; ); where  is a positive parameter that represents the relative
strength of the psychological payo¤ to material prot and h(; ) is function that is increasing in
both of its arguments. An example of h(; ) is just the payo¤ of a believer producer: h(; ) =
(1+g)2
4 + p (where we can set p =   m for some constant m = b > 0), and for specicity
we shall employ that particular form. Then, the total payo¤ for a believer ruler for  2 (g; 0)
becomes (see proof of part (ii) of Proposition 3 for the prot component):
r( 2 (g; 0)) =
g
4
(   1 + (g)2)
(1  g) + [(
(1 + g)2
4
+  m)  
2(g)3
4(1  g) ]
For the payo¤ to be increasing in the fraction of believers  2 (g; 0), the following Assumption
needs to be satised:
Assumption B:  > 
2(g)3
(1 g)[(1+g)2+4 4m]
15Furthermore, building a church that might take more than ones lifetime (as routinely has occurred) requires an
especially long-term horizon and therefore an extended notion of protability to encompass a ruling dynasty, while
it is consistent with genuine belief on the part of the ruler who undertakes such a project.
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An example of the total payo¤ of a ruler who is a believer and satises Assumption B, so that
payo¤ is increasing everywhere in , is depicted in Figure 3 which satises assumptions A and B
and uses the same parameter values as Figure 2 with the addition of m = 0:05 and  = 0:07.
      -
Figure 3
      -
Denoting by I ; I, and I the investments in ; , and  , let c(I; I; I) be the joint cost
function. To ensure interior solutions, we assume a strictly convex cost function and, to allow for
positive investments when the marginal benets to an investment are positive, we can assume that
@c
@Ii Ii!0 = 0 for i = ; ; . Furthermore, we assume the returns to each investments are increasing
and concave, so that  = (I);  = (I), and  = (I). In addition to investments in Big God,
we consider the possibility of investing in state capacity so that  = (S) (where () is increasing
and strictly concave) and S are the corresponding investment expenditures.
Given that the rulers payo¤ function has four di¤erent segments, the incentives for investments
di¤er across those segments. Nevertheless, qualitatively the incentives have some common features.
Consider rst the case of  2 [0; g] in which the prot of the ruler is as in (10) with the addition of
the psychological component h(; ) :
r( 2 [0; g]) = g
4
(   1)
(1  g) +

4
(g)2 + [
(1 + g)2
4
+  m]  c(I ; I; I)  S (11)
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Letting superscript gdenote optimal investment values in that segment, the rst-order conditions
for investments in ;  ; , and S are as follows
0(Ig)
4
[(g)2 + ((1 + g)2 + 4( m)] = @c(I
g
 ; I
g
; I
g
)
@I
g
2
0(Ig)[(1 + g) + g] =
@c(Ig ; I
g
; I
g
)
@I
0(Ig) =
@c(Ig ; I
g
; I
g
)
@I
g
4
0(Sg)

1  g
(1  g)2 + 2 ((1 + g) + g)

=1 (12)
The left-hand side of each condition represents the marginal benet of investing in the particular
attribute, with the right-hand-side representing marginal cost. Note that the sole marginal benet
of investing in morality, in the third equation, comes from the believer rulers own psychological
payo¤. In the absence of that psychological payo¤, no incentive to invest in morality exists in this
and any other case, except possibly  2 (1; 1].
Note that in the rst condition (investment in the fraction of believers), the marginal return on
investing in  is increasing in ; , and . The result implies that if those other variables were to
increase, an incentive to increase the investment in  would materialize. Inspection of the second
condition reveals that larger values of  and  also increase the marginal return to investing in
. The fourth condition also shows how larger values of  and  increase the marginal return to
investing in  as well. That is, investments in ; , and  are complementary to one another.
Investments in morality are not fully complementary to the other investments for the case at
hand. We can use the same procedure to study the rulers incentives (who is a believer) to invest
in , ,  and  for the remaining three segments of . The same ndings for complementarity
hold for the segment [0; 1], but less general ones hold for the two other segments. Furthermore,
the marginal benet of investing in morality () is highest in the segment  2 (1; 1]. It is however
always increasing in  in all segments. We summarize the main results of this section in Proposition
4.
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Proposition 4: Suppose that assumptions A and B are satised. Then, the following results
hold:
(i) A believer rulers total payo¤ is everywhere increasing in .
(ii) For  2 [0; g]; investments in the fraction of believers (), in the legitimacy of the ruler
(), and in state capacity ( ) are complementary.
(iii) For  2 (g; 0) the marginal return on investment in the fraction of believers () is
increasing in the legitimacy of the ruler () and in state capacity ( ) for su¢ ciently large .
(iv) For  2 [0; 1] investments in the number of believers (), in the legitimacy of the ruler
(), and in state capacity ( ) are complementary.
(v) For  2 (1; 1], investments in believersmorality () have the highest marginal benet than
over any other range of .
(vi) The marginal return on investment in morality () is increasing in the fraction of believers
() and investment in  stimulates investment in .
The complementarities among the di¤erent types of investments relate to the marginal benet
sides of the investments. It also is quite plausible to have complementarities on the cost side,
especially among the three types of investments in religion; that is the reason we have specied it
as a joint cost function c(I; I; I). What that specication allows is, for example, the catechism
and instruction by religious gures on morality to complement messages on the piety of the monarch
and his divine right to be a monarch. Houses of religious worship likewise can play all three roles in
expanding recruitment and conversion, in deepening morality among worshippers, and in enhancing
the sense of the rulers legitimacy.
The fact that the rulers prots as well as the rulers total payo¤(including the psychological one)
are maximal at very high population shares of believers and the incentives for various investments
are strong at those levels all imply a drive towards consolidation and institutionalization of Big-
God religions so that they become essentially monopoly (established) state religions. Church or
mosque or temple becomes a center of community life and believers densely embedded within them,
with the rulers and Big Gods overseeing all. Some Christian rulers prohibited other religions while
some Muslim rulers allowed as their subjects only peoples of the book. To this day, atheists and
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even agnostics appear to be distrusted the most in nearly all countries (Norenzayan 2013, Ch.4).
It is not necessary for many polities that all subjects adhere to one particular Big-God religion but
it appears to be necessary that subjects must have adhered to some Big-God religion.
Furthermore, the complementarities among state capacity and the various religious investments
indicate that the legitimacy and morality functions of Big-God religions, along with state capacity,
can be thought of as a cultural and political packagethat provided an evolutionary advantage to
a ruler who probably would not survive by picking and choosing only a subset of such a package.
That conjecture is analogous to the arguments that Boyd (2017) has made about human evolution
- compared to that of other animals - as based on cultures conceived as packages of beliefs, norms
and practices.
7 Concluding remarks
We would like to emphasize the last point about Big-God religions providing a package of attributes
that enhanced a rulers evolutionary advantage. That package may have included attributes addi-
tional to those we have examined that could be explored in future theoretical or empirical research.
One attribute that Big-God religions might have induced is the consolidation of the aristocracys
identity beyond the tribe, clan or ethnic group. In turn, that more well-dened identity would have
reduced free-rider problems and enhanced the cohesion of aristocracies, especially in large multi-
ethnic states. Another possibly helpful attribute of Big-God religions is that, through their emphasis
of holy texts or other books, a concomitant tendency for literacy to emerge and grow among state
o¢ cials likely improves the administrative and legal capacity of the state. For example, the newly
converted Anglo-Saxon kings of England codied folk customs into the kings law (Fletcher 1997,
p.118). Finally, ruler legitimacy could well go beyond the specic e¤ects of better tax compliance
and lower cost of hiring believers than we have examined here.
As for long-term implications, one side-e¤ect of the adoption of Big Gods was growth in economic
activity. That conclusion is consistent with the intuition in Olson (1993) that a ruler who behaves
like a stationary bandit perhaps unintentionally improves the economy. Morality and norms help
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directly with economic exchange and the rulers legitimacy improves tax collection and production of
public goods. That appears to be the case for pre-modern states and their economies, but how much
can we extend these e¤ects of Big Gods to modern states and economies? Much of contemporary
economic activity takes place in markets with anonymous buyers and sellers and exchange often is
impersonal, requiring formal property rights. Morality and norms are not su¢ cient for impersonal
exchange and constitutionally unconstrained rulers have di¢ culty commiting credibly to property
rights enforcement (North et al. 2009). Moreover, the modern nation-states legitimacy is not
based on Divine Will but popular sovereignty and the idea of citizenship. Likewise, nationality is
the primary identication of citizens, not religious identication (although national identication
is sometimes based on religious identication). Morality and norms still are relevant, however,
and the e¤ects of long-ago established states within a modern states boundaries has been argued
(Wimmer 2018) to be an important factor in successful modern economic development. How the
legacy of older Big-God states a¤ects modern growth is unclear and worthy of investigation.
Acknowledgments
For useful conversations and advice on the earlier version of the paper titled For-Prot States
and Big Gods, we thank Alina Arseniev-Koehler, Renaud Bellais, Dan Bogart, Rob Boyd, Jean-
Paul Carvalho, Metin Cosgel, Larry Iannaccone, Mike McBride, Eleni Skaperdas, and participants
at the ASREC conference in Boston in March 2019, a brown bag presentation at Chapman Univer-
sity, and the conference on the predatory state at University of Paris 13. Two anonymous referees
provided extensive comments that helped us signicantly improve our argument.
27
Appendix to Why did pre-modern states adopt Big-God reli-
gions?
Proof of Proposition 1: Part (i): Let  2 [0; s) and suppose, as stated in the proposition,
all believers become producers and heathens distribute themselves between producers and bandits.
The latter would imply that the payo¤s of heathens are equalized so that
Uhb(p
) = (1  s)(1  x) p

1  p = s
(1  x) = Uhp
In such a case, the unique solution for p is p = s. Given this equilibrium number of producers,
the payo¤s of a believer producer and a believer bandit would be related as follows: Up(p) =
s(1  x) + p > Ub(p)  b. Thus, a believer bandit would achieve a payo¤ strictly lower than
that of a producer and therefore a believer could not be a bandit in equilibrium. All believers
become producers and since there are (< s) of them, the rest of the producers ( s   ) must
be heathens. The remainder heathens ( 1   s) must become bandits, with the same payo¤ as
producers. This conguration of proportion of producers (and bandits) and payo¤s satisfy the
conditions for an anarchic equilibrium.
To show uniqueness, suppose another equilibrium exists with a number of producers p0 6= p.
Given that p = s uniquely solves Uhb(p) = Uhp , the other equilibrium must have Uhb(p0) 6= Uhp.
There are then two possibilities.
First, we could have Uhb(p0) > Uhp or that (1 s)(1 x) p
0
1 p0 > s
(1 x) =) p0 > s. Moreover
the inequality in heathen payo¤s, by the denition of equilibrium, implies than no heathens would
become producers - all would become bandits so that b0 = 1   p0  1    or that p0   where
 2 [0; s) and thus p0 < s , contradicting p0 > s in the previous sentence. Therefore, no other
equilibrium can exist in this case.
Second, we could have Uhb(p0) < Uhp or that (1   s)(1   x) p
0
1 p0 < s
(1   x) =) p0 < s.
This inequality of heathen payo¤s, by the denition of equilibrium, implies that no heathens would
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become bandits - all would become producers. In addition, the following
Up  s(1  x) + p >
> s(1  x) > (1  s)(1  x) p
0
1  p0 >
> (1  s)(1  x) p
0
1  p0   b = Ub(p
0)given thatp > 0andb > 0
imply Up > Ub(p0) or that all believers would also become producers, thus leading to p0 = 1, a
contradiction to p0 < s < 1. Therefore, no other equilibrium can exist in this case as well and the
equilibrium (where p = s) is unique.
Part (ii): Let  2 [s; s(1 x)+(1 x)+ ]. Then, p =  satises Up  s(1   x) + p  (1  
s)(1 x) p1 p  b = Ub(p) and therefore it is consistent with all believers becoming producers.
Moreover, p =  implies Uhb(p) = (1 s)(1 x) p

1 p  s(1 x) = Uhp and therefore consistent
with all heathens becoming bandits so that b = 1  p = 1   . Since all equilibrium conditions
are satised, p =  is an equilibrium.
To show uniqueness, consider another equilibrium with p0 6=  . If p0 > , then at least
some producers must be heathens. However, this would require Uhb(p0) = (1   s)(1   x) p
0
1 p0 
s(1   x) = Uhp thereby implying p0  s   which is a contradiction. Thus we cannot have
p0 > .
If p0 < , then at least some believers must be bandits. However, we would then have
Up  s(1   x) + p  (1   s)(1   x) 1    b > (1   s)(1   x) p
0
1 p0   b = Ub(p0)
contradicting the equilibrium condition that believer bandits should be having at least as high a
payo¤ as believer producers.
Therefore no equilibrium other than p =  exists.
Part (iii): Let  2 ( s(1 x)+(1 x)+ ; 1]. Having believers become both producers and bandits would
equate the payo¤s of the two professions so that Up  s(1 x)+p = (1 s)(1 x) p

1 p  b =
Ub(p
), which implies p = s
(1 x)+
(1 x)+ . Then, Uhb(p
) = (1 s)(1 x) p1 p > (1 s)(1 x) p

1 p 
b   p = s(1  x) = Uhp , which implies that no heathens can be producers as required by the
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equilibrium. Thus, the conditions for the equilibrium described are satised.
To show uniqueness, suppose another equilibrium p0 6= s(1 x)+(1 x)+ . If p0 > s
(1 x)+
(1 x)+ , then we
would have Ub(p0) = (1  s)(1  x) p
0
1 p0   b > s(1  x) + p = Up
as well as
Uhb(p
0) = (1  s)(1  x) p01 p0 > (1  s)(1  x) p
0
1 p0   b   p > s(1  x) = Uhp
which imply that neither believers nor heathens would choose to become producers, a contra-
diction.
If p0 < s
(1 x)+
(1 x)+ , then we would have
Ub(p
0) = (1  s)(1  x) p01 p0   b < s(1  x) + p = Up
which implies than no believers can be bandits and all believers must be producers. But then,
since the number of believers   s(1 x)+(1 x)+ , we have  > p0 or that the number of believers is
greater than the number of producers, a contradiction.
Therefore the equilibrium must be unique in this case as well.
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (i): Note that
x = argmax xUp(x) = [(1  )s(x) + s(x+ g)](1  x) + p
Di¤erentiation of (6) yields
@Up(x)
@x = [(1  )s0(x) + s0(x+ g)](1  x)  [(1  )s(x) + s(x+ g)]
Since s(x) is strictly concave, we have s0(x) > s0(x + g) for all x and g > 0: Therefore, we
have:
[(1  )s0(x) + s0(x+ g)] < s0(x)
Moreover, since s(x) < s(x+ g) we also have
[(1  )s(x) + s(x+ g)] > s(x)
The last two inequalities imply
@Up(x)
@x = [(1   )s0 (x) + s0(x + g)](1   x)   [(1   )s(x) + s(x + g)] < s0(x)(1  
x)  s(x) = 0
with the last equality sign following from the optimality condition of a heathen producer (or a
believer producer with  = 0). Then, for x 2 (0; 1), we must have
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@Up(x)
@x < 0 =
@Up(x)
@x
Given that s(x) < 0 , we can readily show that @
2Up(x)
@x2
< 0 . We must then have x < x as
stated in the Proposition.
By totally di¤erentiating the rst-order condition we can readily show that x is decreasing in
.
Part (ii): The stated properties of 1  x readily follow from the properties of x .
Part (iii): The material payo¤ of a producer who is a believer is s(x)(1  x). Then, we have
@s(x)(1 x)
@ =
@x
@ s
0(x)(1  x)  s(x)@x@ = @x

@ [s
0(x)(1  x)  s(x)]
Given that, by part (i) of the Proposition, @x

@ < 0, to that show that the material payo¤ of a
believer producer is decreasing in , it su¢ ces to show that
s0(x)(1  x)  s(x) > 0
_
Note that @Up(x
)
@x = 0 implies
[(1  )s0(x) + s0(x + g)](1  x) = (1  )s(x) + s(x + g)
Given that s(x) is strictly concave, we have s0(x) > s0(x+g) and, therefore, s0(x)(1 x) > [(1 
)s0(x)+s0(x+g)](1 x). Moreover, since s(x) is increasing (1 )s(x)+s(x+g) > s(x).
We therefore have s0(x)(1  x) > s(x) or that s0(x)(1  x)  s(x) > 0 and
@s(x)(1  x)
@
< 0
as required. Recall that a heathen producers material payo¤ is s(x)(1  x) where x maximizes
s(x)(1   x). We have already proved that x 6= x. Hence it follows readily that s(x)(1   x) <
s(x)(1  x) so that a heathen producer has a higher material payo¤ than a believer producer.
Proof of Proposition 3: Part (i): We have already shown the derivation of the rulers payo¤
31
function under the assumption that all believers are guards in the main text. It remains to be
shown that this yields a higher payo¤ than hiring some or all heathens for guards and having some
or all believers become producers. Let 0    1. Suppose that  believers are guards while
the rest are producers. Accordingly g    heathens are guards while the rest divide up between
production and banditry. In that case, the number of producers p0 consists (1  ) believers and
p0  (1 ) heathens (with the latter receiving a payo¤ of 14) and the payo¤ of heathen producers
and bandits equalized as below:
1
4
=
(1  )(1+g2   g)1+g2 + (p0   (1  ))
 
1
2   g

1
2
1  p0   g
which yields the following number of producers:
p0 =
1  g
2(1  g) + 
(  1) g(2 + g   2g)
2(1  g)
Note that the number of producers in this case (when some believers become producers instead
of guards) is generally lower than number of producers when all believers become guards (derived
in the equation before (9)) as the second term is non-positive since   1. This is the greater
leakage of output, mentioned in the main text, when some believers become producers. The
di¤erence in the number of producers is equivalent to having more bandits which translates into
lower prots for the ruler. In particular, given p0, the rulers payo¤ is: 0r( 2 [0; g]) = g 1+g2 +
[ 1 g2(1 g)    g(2+g 2g)2(1 g) ]g 12   g 14
= g4
( 1)
(1 g)+
(g)2( g)
4(1 g) Observe that the above payo¤ is strictly increasing in . Hence the optimal
level of  is 1. This gives us the payo¤ r( 2 [0; g]) in (10) which is indeed the appropriate one
for  2 [0; g].
Part (ii): Let  2 (g; 0). By the arguments made in the main text and in the proof of part
(i), all guards should be believers with the rest becoming producers (as all bandits are heathens
and no believer has an incentive to become a bandit when there are su¢ ciently high numbers of
heathens). That is, believer producers number  g. Heathens become producers and bandits until
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the number of believers becomes su¢ ciently large so that no heathens choose to become producers.
This su¢ ciently large number of believers is 0 and is derived by equating the payo¤ of a heathen
bandit when all producers are believers to the payo¤ of a heathen producer or
(0   g)(1+g2   g)1+g2
1  0
=
1
4
which yields the 0 stated in the Proposition.
To determine the rulers payo¤ function for that range of s, we need to determine the number
of producers p00 and bandits from the following equality of heathen payo¤s between bandit and
producer:
(   g)(1+g2   g)1+g2 + [p00   (   g)](12   g)12
1  p00   g =
1
4
which yields a p00 which is analogous to p0 above:
p00 =
1  g
2(1  g)   (   g)
g((2 + g   2g)
2(1  g)
By using this number of bandits in the rulers payo¤ we eventually obtain: r( 2 (g; 0)) =
(   g)g 1+g2 + [p00   (   g)]]g 12   g 1 (g)
2
4
= g4
( 1+(g)2)
(1 g)   
2(g)3
4(1 g) which is strcitly decreasing in , as stated in the Proposition.
Part (iii): Let  2 [0; 1]. Over that range of s,1 is dened so that the payo¤ of a believer
producer just equals the payo¤ of believer bandit. That is,
(1   g)(1+g2   g)1+g2
1  1
  b =
(1 + g)2
4
+ p
where the left-hand side is the believer bandits payo¤ and the right-hand side is the believer
producers payo¤. (Note that the believer producers payo¤ is always greater than 14 , the heathen
producers payo¤, and therefore heathen bandits must be receiving a higher payo¤ than 14 as well.)
The 1 dened in the Proposition is the unique solution from this equation. Then, in the range
between 0 and 1 all bandits are heathens and any new believers become producers, replacing
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one-for-one the heathen bandits. Thus, as  increases, the ruler gains the tax revenue from the
extra producers without any cost. The payo¤ of the ruler is as follows
r( 2 (0; 1)) = (   g)g
1 + g
2
  g1  (g)
2
4
which is strictly increasing in  with a slope of the extra tax revenue g 1+g2 .
Part (iv): Let  2 (1; 1]. Beyond 1, all extra believers become bandits - every new believer
replaces a heathen bandit. That is, over that range the number of producers is xed at 1   g and
therefore the prots of the ruler do not change with changes in  and are constant at:
r( 2 (1; 1]) = (1   g)g
1 + g
2
  g1  (g)
2
4
Proof of Proposition 4: Parts (i) and (ii): proofs are already discussed in the main text.
Part (iii): Recall that the total payo¤ of a believer ruler over the second segment (g; 0) is
r( 2 (g; 0)) = g4 ( 1+(g)
2)
(1 g) + [(
(1+g)2
4 +  m)  
2(g)3
4(1 g) ]
From above, it is clear that the marginal return on investing in  denoted by MBI2 (where
the subscript 2 is a reminder that we are working with the second segment of the believer rulers
payo¤) is as below.
MBI2 =
@r(2(g;0))
@I
= 0(I)[(
(1+g)2
4 +  m)  
2(g)3
4(1 g) ]
From above, it follows that:
@MBI2
@I
= 0(I:)0(I)g2 [(1 + g)  g
22
(1 g) ]
@MBI2
@S = 
0(I)0(S)g2 [(1 + g)  g
22+2g22(1 g)
2(1 g)2 ]
By inspection, it follows that
@MBI2
@I
> 0 when  > g
22
(1 g)(1+g)( 1): It readily follows that
this condition is stronger than Assumption B.
By inspection, it follows that
@MBI2
@S > 0 when  >
g22+2g22(1 g)
2(1 g)2(1+g) ( 2). Since g < 12 , it
is apparent that 2 > 1.
Hence both
@MBI2
@I
and
@MBI2
@S are strictly positive when  is su¢ ciently high ( > 2).
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Part (iv): The total payo¤ of a believer ruler over the range [0; 1] is
r( 2 [0; 1]) = (   g)g
1 + g
2
  g1  (g)
2
4
+ (
(1 + g)2
4
+  m)
The rst-order conditions for the investments in ; , and  in this segment (denoted by I0; I
0
,
and S0) are below. (We do not include the rst-order condition for investment in  ( I0) because
it is not complementary to all others.) 0(I0)[g
1+g
2 + (
(1+g)2
4 +  m)] =
@c(I0 ;I
0
 ;I
0
)
@I
0(I0)
g
2 [(   g)g + g2 + (1 + g)] =
@c(I0 ;I
0
 ;I
0
)
@I
0(S0)g2 [(   g)(1 + 2g) + 2g2 + (1 + g)] = 1
The left-hand-side of the rst condition is increasing in  and ; that of the second condition
is increasing in  and , and that of the third condition is increasing in  and . Therefore, the
three investments are complementary to each other as stated in the Proposition.
Part (v): The total payo¤ of a believer ruler is over the range (1; 1] is
r( 2 (1; 1]) = (1   g)g
1 + g
2
  g1  (g)
2
4
+ (
(1 + g)2
4
+  m)
where 1 =
(1+g)(1+g)2+4 2g2(1+g)
2(1+g)2+4 2g(1+g)
Note that
@r( 2 (1; 1])
@
=
g(1  g)(1 + g)2(1 + g(   2))
2[1 + 2+ 2g2(   1) + g(2   1)]2 + 
Observe that the second term is the same term (from the rulers psychological payo¤) encoun-
tered in all other segments of rulers payo¤. Therefore we will have @r(2(1;1])@ >
@r( =2(1;1])
@
as long as the rst term is positive. Since the denominator of the rst term is always positive and
 2 (0; 1), a su¢ cient condition for the rst term to be positive is g < 1(2 ) , which is always true
since g < 12 <
1
(2 ) . Hence we have
@r(2(1;1])
@ >
@r( =2(1;1]
@ as stated in the Proposition.
Part (vi): This part follows straightforwardly from the observations that for all ranges of  ,
@2r
@@ =  > 0 and 
0(I) and 0(I) are both strictly positive as well.
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Range of  : Believers () become: Heathens (1  ) become:
[0; g] All guards Guards, producers, bandits
(g; 0) Guards and producers Producers and bandits
[0; 1] Guards and producers All bandits
(1; 1] Guards, producers, and bandits All bandits
Table 1: Populations occupational choice
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